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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cesar Guardiola filed a notice of appeal timely only from

district court's

February 5, 2013 order denying his Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of his
sentence. Nevertheless, Guardiola attempts on appeal to challenge the district
court's December 12, 2012 order revoking his probation and executing the
underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed, imposed upon his
conviction for aggravated DUI.

Specifically, Guardiola claims the district court

abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte reduce his sentence upon revoking
probation. He also asserts the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional
rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with as-yet
prepared transcripts he claims are relevant to review of the district court's
decision, upon revoking his probation, to order his sentence executed without
reduction.

Because Guardiola did not timely appeal the district court's order

revoking his probation and executing his sentence without reduction, his
appellate challenge to that order is not properly before this Court and his claim of
a constitutional violation necessarily fails.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In October 2004, Guardiola drove while intoxicated and caused an
accident resulting in serious injuries to the occupants of the vehicle he rearended.

(PSI, p.2.)

The state charged Guardiola with aggravated DUI. (PSI,

pp.21-22.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Guardiola pied guilty
and the parties "agree[d] the appropriate sentence to be imposed" was "a
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sentence of two (2) years, fixed; three (3) years, indeterminate," with the
sentence to be "suspended and defendant placed on five years('] probation." (R.,
pp.35-39). The district court accepted the plea agreement, imposed the agreed
upon underlying sentence and placed Guardiola on probation for five years. (R.,
pp.40-46, 48-51, 55-59.)
In March 2007, the state filed a Report of Probation Violation alleging
Guardiola had been cited for driving without privileges, changed residences
without permission, failed to maintain employment, and failed to make payments
towards his fines, restitution and costs of supervision. (R., pp.73-77.) Guardiola
admitted the allegations, and the court reinstated him on probation with additional
conditions. (R., pp.87-90, 92-93.)
On March 5, 2009, the state filed a second Report of Probation Violation,
alleging Guardiola had failed to submit written monthly reports for the months of
November and December 2008 and January 2009, failed to make any restitution
payments since August 2007, and failed to make any payments toward his costs
of supervision since May 2008.

(R., pp.98-102.)

Guardiola admitted the

allegations (R., pp.124-26), and the district court reinstated him on and extended
his probation until June 5, 2015, with additional conditions (R., pp.127-32).
One month after being reinstated on probation for the second time,
Guardiola was ordered to serve discretionary jail time as a sanction for failing to
make adequate payments towards his restitution obligation

(R., pp.133-40.)

Three months after that, the state filed a third Report of Probation Violation,
alleging Guardiola had changed residences without permission, failed to report
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a mandatory budget class as instructed by his supervising officer, failed to
maintain employment, failed to

any payments toward restitution since

January 2011, and failed to make payment toward his costs of supervision since
May 2008. (R., pp.141-45.) Guardiola admitted to having changed his residence
without permission, failing to report and failing to make restitution payments, and
the state withdrew the remaining allegations. (R., pp.174-77.) At a hearing on
November 19, 2012, the district court revoked Guardiola's probation and ordered
his underlying sentence executed.

(R., pp.178-81, 187-88.) Guardiola filed a

timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court
denied. (R., pp.182-84, 191-211.) Guardiola filed a notice of appeal timely only
from the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.213-15.)
On appeal, Guardiola filed a motion to augment the record with transcripts
of (1) his August 4, 2005 change of plea hearing; (2) his June 6, 2005 sentencing
hearing; (3) his May 21, 2007 "evidentiary/dispositional hearing"; (4) his
November 22, 2010 evidentiary hearing; and (5) his December 15, 2010
dispositional hearing. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule
and Statement in Support Thereof ("Motion"), filed July 3, 2013.)
Supreme Court denied the motion. (Order, dated July 26, 2013.)
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The Idaho

ISSUES
Guardiola states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Guardiola due
process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to
Augment with transcripts necessary for review of the issues
on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to
reduce Mr. Guardiola's sentence sua sponte upon revoking
probation?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Must this Court decline to consider Guardiola's challenge to the district
court's order revoking his probation and executing his sentence without
reduction because Guardiola failed to file his notice of appeal within 42
days of that order?

2.

If this Court addresses the issue, has Guardiola failed to show the district
court abused its discretion by not sua sponte reducing his sentence upon
revoking probation?

3.

If this Court addresses the issue, has Guardiola failed to show any
constitutional violation resulting from the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of
his motion to augment the record with transcripts that are not relevant to
any issue properly before this Court on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Entertain Guardiola's Claim That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Underlying
Sentence Upon Revoking His Probation

A.

Introduction
Guardiola argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by

not sua sponte reducing his sentence upon revoking his probation. (Appellant's
brief, pp.20-21.)

This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Guardiola's claim

because Guardiola failed to timely appeal from the district court's order revoking
his probation and executing his underlying sentence without reduction.

B.

Standard Of Review
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free
'

review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.

C.

This Court Must Decline To Consider Guardiola's Claim That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence
Upon Revoking His Probation Because Guardiola Failed To File His
Notice Of Appeal Within 42 Days Of The Challenged Order
Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that an appeal may be

taken from an order from the district court in any criminal action within 42 days
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from the date of the filing of the order. A motion for reduction of sentence can
extend the time for filing an appeal, but only if the motion is filed within 14 days of
the entry of judgment. State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 593, 199 P.3d 769, 770
(2008); State v. Yeaton, 121 Idaho 1018, 1019, 829 P.2d 1367, 1368 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing I.AR. 14). An "order revoking probation is not a judgment" and, as
such, the filing of a Rule 35 motion within 14 days of such order does not
terminate the running of the time for appeal from that order. Thomas, 146 Idaho
at 594, 199 P .3d at 771. The requirement of perfecting an appeal within the 42day time period is jurisdictional. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594, 199 P.3d at 771;
State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982).
Guardiola's appeal is not timely from the district court's order revoking his
probation and executing his underlying sentence. The district court entered the
order revoking Guardiola's probation on December 12, 2012.

(R., pp.187-88.)

Guardiola filed his Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction eight days earlier, on
December 4, 2012. (R., pp.182-84.) He filed his notice of appeal on March 7,
2013 - 85 days after the entry of the order revoking his probation. (R., p.21315.) Guardiola's motion for sentence reduction, although filed within 14 days of
the order revoking his probation, did not extend the time for appealing from that
order. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594, 199 P.3d at 771; Yeaton, 121 Idaho at 1019,
829 P.2d at 1368. Because Guardiola's notice of appeal was not timely from the
court's order revoking probation and executing his sentence, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review the district court's exercise of discretion in relation to that
order.

&
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Ii.
If This Court Addresses The Issue. Guardiola Has Failed To Show The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing The Underlying
Sentence To Vvhich He Stipulated As Part Of His Plea Agreement

A

Introduction
Guardiola contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to sua

sponte reduce his sentence upon revoking his probation.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.20-21.) Even if not jurisdictionally barred, Guardiola's argument fails for two
alternative reasons. First, Guardiola stipulated to the underlying sentence and is
therefore

precluded

by

the

invited

error doctrine from

challenging

the

reasonableness of that sentence on appeal. Alternatively, Guardiola has failed to
show an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Guardiola Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Challenging
The Reasonableness Of The Sentence To Which He Stipulated As Part Of
The Binding Plea Agreement
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining

that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or
acquiesced in was error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80
(Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party
who "caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court" to take a
particular action from "later challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake,
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133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999).

This doctrine applies to

sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho
462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
As part of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, signed by Guardiola,
Guardiola stipulated to the imposition of a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed. (R., pp.38-39.) Despite its "serious reservations," the district court
accepted the plea agreement and imposed the agreed upon sentence.

(R.,

pp.40-46, 48-51.) Because Guardiola received the precise sentence to which he
agreed, he cannot claim on appeal that the sentence is excessive or that the
district court abused its discretion by declining to sua sponte reduce it.
Guardiola's claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine
of invited error.

D.

Alternatively, Guardiola Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence Upon Revoking
Probation
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original

sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).

A court's

decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
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excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover,
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing."
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing
court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.
Guardiola has not shown that he was entitled to a sua sponte reduction of
his sentence. As explained by the district court in its order denying Guardiola's
Rule 35 motion (which Guardiola does not challenge on appeal (see Appellant's
brief, p.2, n.1)), the unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to which
Guardiola agreed was neither "unjust, unduly harsh, or inappropriate" (R., p.209),
and nothing about his conduct since the sentence was imposed warranted any
reduction, much less a reduction he never requested at the time the court
revoked his probation.

The state submits Guardiola has failed to establish an

abuse of discretion for reasons more fully set forth in the district court's Order On
Motion To Reconsider Sentence Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which the
state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
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111.
If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, That Court Lacks
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Guardiola's
Motion To Augment The Record; Alternatively, Guardiola Has Failed To Show
Any Constitutional Violation Resulting From The Denial Of His Motion To
Augment
A.

Introduction
Guardiola contends, that by denying his motion to augment the appellate

record with as-yet-unprepared transcripts of various hearings, the Idaho
Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection and has denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-20.) Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, however, that Court lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision to deny Guardiola's motion. Further, even if the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of Guardiola's motion is reviewed on appeal, Guardiola has failed
to establish a violation of his constitutional rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
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C.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case. Lacks The
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision
The Idaho Court of Appeals has "disclaim[ed] any authority to

and,

in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior
to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the
Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other
law." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,620, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012). "Such
an undertaking," the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of
Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is
plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

kl

However, the Idaho Court of

Appeals did leave open the possibility of review of such motions in some
circumstances. Id. Such circumstances may occur, the Court indicated, where
"the completed appellant's and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified, or
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support
a renewed motion."

kl

Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order.

Guardiola has failed to

demonstrate the need for additional transcripts, and he has not presented any
evidence to support a renewed motion to augment the record. The arguments
Guardiola advances on appeal as to why the record should be augmented with
the transcripts at issue constitute essentially the same arguments he presented
to the Idaho Supreme Court in his motion - i.e., that the scope of appellate
review of a sentence requires consideration of such and that his constitutional
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rights will be violated without the transcripts. (Compare Motion with Appellant's
Brief, pp.5-20.)
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and in
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Guardiola
has failed to provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appellant's Brief that
would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals
must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme Court's
denial of Guardiola's motion to augment the record.

D.

Even If This Court Reviews The Merits Of Guardiola's Argument,
Guardiola Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Guardiola's constitutional

claims, all of his arguments fail. Guardiola argues he is entitled to the additional
transcripts because "they are relevant to the issue of whether the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon
revoking probation .... " (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) This argument is meritless on
its face; as explained in Section I, supra, Guardiola's appeal is not timely from
the district court's order revoking his probation and executing his sentence
without reduction and, as such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to even consider
whether the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte reducing
Guardiola's sentence upon revoking his probation.

Because this Court lacks

jurisdiction to review the only issue to which Guardiola claims the requested
transcripts are relevant, Guardiola's claim that the transcripts are necessary for
review of that issue necessarily fails.
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Even if this Court reviews the merits of Guardiola's challenge to
upon revoking probation, to order his sentence executed
reduction, Guardiola has still failed to demonstrate entitlement to the requested
transcripts. Guardiola claims the failure to provide the transcripts is a violation of
his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the effective
assistance of appellate counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-20.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court recently rejected the same arguments in State v. Brunet, 2013
WL 6001894 (2013). 1
In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that
transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of
the appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet
at *3 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 )). "[CJolorable
need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts exhibited."

kt

In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the requested

transcripts contained specific information relevant to [the] appeal."

Id.

"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of ... transcripts could prevent [the appellant]
from determining whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there
was factual information contained in the transcripts that might relate to his
arguments" does not demonstrate a "colorable need."

In other words, an

appellant is not entitled to transcripts in order to "search the transcripts for a
reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in the first place."

kt

Such an

endeavor is a '"fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense" - an exercise the

Guardiola did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Brunet when he
wrote his Appellant's brief.
1
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constitution does not endorse.

In short, "[m]ere speculation or hope that

something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific
information necessary to establish a colorable need."

kl

Guardiola argues the transcripts from his 2005 change of plea and
sentencing hearings, his 2007 "evidentiary/dispositional hearing," and his 2010
evidentiary and disposition hearings are relevant, regardless of whether they
have been prepared or not, because "a district court is not limited to considering
only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal was filed" but
rather "the applicable standard of review requires an

independent and

comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the
events

which

occurred

during,

the

probation

revocation

proceedings."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) Although the appellate court's review of a sentence
is independent, as noted in Brunet, the review is limited to the "entire record
available to the trial court at sentencing." 2013 WL 6001894 at *4 (citing State v.
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). As in Brunet, the record in
this case contains the relevant sentencing materials, including the original
presentence report, with attachments, prepared in April 2005.

(See generally

PSI.) It also includes all of the reports of probation violation (R., pp.73-77, 98111, 141-48), as well as the minutes of all the hearings for which Guardiola
desires a transcript (R., pp.35-37, 40-46, 87-90, 124-26, 127-30). In addition, the
court orders that issued as a result of each hearing are included in the record.
(R., pp.47-59, 92-93, 131-32.) "Therefore, the entire record available to the trial

court at sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *4. As

14

, Guardiola "has failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or
equal

r"T'"''"'T'''"'

by

Court's refusal to order the creation of transcripts

expense in order to augment the record on appeal."

kl

Despite the availability of the court minutes and prior sentencing materials,
Guardiola suggests this is inadequate, complaining that "[t]o ignore the positive
factors that were present at the previous hearings," which resulted in "multiple
periods of probation," "presents a negative, one-sided view of [him]" and deprives
him "from addressing those positive factors in support of his appellate sentencing
claims." (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Guardiola, however, fails to explain why
that information cannot be derived from the available record or, if such factors
existed, why they should not have been presented to the court at the final
disposition hearing (assuming they were not presented, which is unlikely).
Regardless, this argument is representative of the sort of fishing expedition the
Court in Brunet said was improper.
Guardiola next argues that "effective counsel cannot be given in the
absence of access to the relevant transcripts."

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) This

argument also fails. Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of
the requested transcripts for incorporation into the record" results in the
"prospective[ ]" denial of the effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet
concluded Brunet "failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance fell
below an

objective

standard

of reasonableness

without

the

requested

transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is
contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *5. The same is true in this
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case.

'This record meets [Guardiola's] right to a record sufficient to afford

adequate and effective appellate review."

kl

As such, Guardiola has failed to

show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the denial of his motion to augment.
Because Guardiola failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the
transcripts he was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the
denial of his motion to augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional
rights, his claims fail.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court (1) dismiss Guardiola's
appeal insofar as it seeks relief from the district court's order revoking probation
and executing his underlying sentence; and (2) hold Guardiola's rights were not
violated by the denial of his motion to augment.
DATED this 13th day of December, 2013.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-2004-22475

ORDER ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER SENTENCE
PURSUANT TO IDAHO
CRIMINAL RULE 35

This matter having come before the court upon the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Motion to Extend Time, filed December 4,
2012; and the State's Objection to Rule 35 Motion and Request for Hearing, filed December 10,
2012; and Defendant having been represented by the office of the Canyon County Public

Defender; and the State having been represented by the office of the Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney; and the court having entered on December 18, 2012, its Order Setting Deadline for
Submission of Supplemental Materials for Rule 35 Motion; and the Defendant having filed on

January 30, 2013, Supplemental Information to Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Request to Seal Attachments; and the court having considered the
file and record in this action; the contents of the Pre-Sentence Investigation report; the conduct
and performance of the Defendant while on probation; the arguments and recommendations of
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counsel; together \Vith the applicable law; this court does hereby render its ruling as follows.
Defendant's motion does not allege that the sentence that was imposed was iilegal, or that it was
imposed in an illegal manner; rather, Defendant's motion is a request for leniency.
BACKGROUND
By an Information filed January 7, 2005, Defendant was charged with one count of
Aggravated Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, with an offense date of October 8, 2004, a
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8006. The maxi.mum penalty for the offense at that time was
ten (10) years in the penitentiary and/or a $5,000 fine; a mandatory minimum of thirty (30) days
in jail; plus a mandatory driver's license suspension of one year absolute, with no opportunity for
restricted driving privileges. On April 4, 2005, the Defendant entered a Conditional Plea of
Guilty Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11 and Binding Plea Agreement. That agreement set

forth the following: "I) The defendant, Cesar Guardiola, will enter a plea of guilty to:
Aggravated DUI; 2) That all parties hereto agree the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon
the defendant is a sentence of two (2) years, fixed; three (3) years, indeterminate. That this
sentence shall be suspended and defendant placed on five years probation. That defendant shall
serve a period of County Jail subject to argument by both parties; 3) The parties agree to be
bound by the terms set forth above; 4) The parties agree that if the Court ultimately rejects this
plea agreement, any statements made by the defendant after execution of this agreement, in
mitigation towards sentence, will not be used as evidence by the State, with the sole exception

that it may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies in an inconsistent manner to said
statements; 5) That should the Court accept the plea agreement as hereinbefore set forth, the
Court will follow and implement the sentence as herein agreed upon. Should the Court reject
this plea agreement, then the Court will give defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea of
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONDISER SENTENCE PURSUANT TO IDAHO
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guilty and this matter 'Will be set for trial." This binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement was signed by
counsel for the State, counsel for the Defendant, and by the Defendant personally. A PreSentence Investigation report was ordered and the case was set for a sentencing hearing on June
6, 2005.

At the time set for sentencL11.g, counsel for the State and the Defendant presented
arguments in support of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement. The court thereafter, after having
considered the arguments of counsel, the statements of the victim, the statements of the
Defendant, the recommendations from the PSI investigator, and the applicable law, imposed the
sentence that had been negotiated by the parties. The court also entered a Restitution Order in
the sum of $18,716.35 and placed the Defendant on a five-year probation. As a condition of
probation, Defendant was ordered to serve 365 days in county jail, with work release privileges.
A Judgment and Commitment and Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment was

filed on June 21, 2005, which reflected the court's oral sentence. On November 3, 2005, the
Defendant filed his Motion to Suspend Balance of County Jail Time. That motion crune before
the court on January 6, 2006. The court granted the motion, with certain conditions, and the
Order Modifying Condition of Probation Re County Jail Time and Imposing Additional Special
Conditions of Probation was filed on February 23, 2006, which, runong other things, required the
Defendant to perform l 00 hours of community service and also converted the remaining 150
days of actual jail time to discretionary jail time.
An Agent's Warrant was served on the Defendant on March 26, 2007, alleging failure to

maintain employment; failure to ask permission to move; and the commission of a new crime-

Driving Without Privileges. A Petition for Probation Violation was filed on March 29, 2007,
incorporating a Report of Violation dated March 28, 2007. The Defendant ultimately came
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before the court for probation violation disposition on May 21, 2007, at which time the
Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated, with certain additional conditions. The Order
on Probation Violation and Order Reinstating was filed on May 24, 2007.
Another Petition for Probation Violation was filed on March 5, 2009, incorporating a
Report of Violation dated February 23, 2009. The State alleged that the Defendant had failed to
submit written monthly reports as ordered; and that the Defendant had failed to pay his financial
obligations. The Report of Violation recommended that the Defendant's probation be revoked
and reinstated. At the probation violation disposition hearing held December 15, 2010, the court
again revoked the Defendant's probation but reinstated it, extending the probation until June 5,
2015, with certain additional conditions. The Order on Probation Violation was filed on
December 17, 2010, which was thereafter modified to stay execution of additional discretionary
jail days by the Order Modifying Order of Probation, filed February 15,2011.
On May 12, 2011, the State filed a third Petition for Probation Violation, incorporating a
Report of Violation dated May 4, 2011. The State alleged that the Defendant had changed
residence without first obtaining the permission of his probation officer; that the Defendant had
failed to submit a truthful written report to the supervising officer each and every month and to
report in person when requested; that the Defendant had failed to seek employment or program
approved by the supervising officer; that the Defendant had failed to make the restitution
payments as ordered; and that the Defendant failed to pay his cost of supervision fees. A warrant
of arrest was issued on May 13, 2011, with a bond of $10,000 that was subsequently recalled.
Thereafter, on June 10, 2011, the court had issued an extraditable warrant on probation violation
with a bond of$50,000. That probation violation warrant was served on August 3, 2012.
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entered a denial of the probation violation charges and an evidentiary

was set for September 19, 2012, before Senior Judge Dennis Goff.

to

negotiations, the Defendant admitted allegations #1, #2, and #3; the State withdrew the
remaining allegations; and the State limited its recommendation at disposition to a period of
retained jurisdiction, with the defense being free to argue for less. A disposition hearing was
scheduled before this court for November 19, 2012. At that time, after considering the
Defendant's performance on probation over a significant period of time, the court revoked the
probation and imposed the sentence. The court noted the potential for a Rule 35 modification
based on the Defendant's alleged medication situation, but declared that the Defendant would
have to submit materials in support of such a consideration. The Amended Judgment and
Commitment on Probation Violation was filed on December 12, 2012. Defendant was given
credit for 167 days served, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-309.
On December 4, 2012, the Defendant filed his Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Motion to Extend Time.
On December 10, 2012, the State's Objection to Rule 35 Motion and Request for Hearing
was filed.
On December 18, 2012, the court entered its Order Setting Deadline for Submission of
Supplemental Materials for Rule 35 Motion.
On January 30, 2013, the Defendant filed Supplemental Information to Motion to
Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Request to Seal Documents.
Defendant asks for a reduction in the fixed portion of his sentence so that he can attend to his
significant medical problems outside of the prison facility. Defendant maintains that he is not
eligible for parole until June 5, 2014. He asserts that while on probation he did not "receive any
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new crimes, violations of alcohol or create any new victims.» Instead, the general nature of the
violations were failing to pay restitution, keep employment, and moving to Utah without
permission initially.

APPLICABLE LAW
A Rule 35 Motion to Reduce Sentence is normally a plea by a criminal defendant for
leniency. A district court is under no obligation to correct, amend or modify a legal sentence that
it has imposed. State vs. Vega, 113 Idaho 756, 747 P.2d 77& (Ct.App.1987). The burden of
establishing that the original sentence was unduly severe rests with the Defendant. State vs.
Wright, 114 Idaho 451,757 P.2d 778 (Ct.App.1987). If the sentence imposed was unduly

severe, for any reason, the district court may in its discretion grant a Rule 35 motion. State vs.

Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 (Ct.App.1984); State vs. Roach, 112 Idaho 173, 730 P.2d
1093 (Ct.App.1986). A motion to correct or modify a sentence "shall be considered and
determined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and W!thout oral
argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion ... " Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
The decision whether to hold a hearing on a Rule 35 motion is directed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In deciding whether an oral hearing is necessary, the inquiry is whether the
defendant could have presented the desired evidence through affidavits filed with his motion, or
whether the denial of a hearing unduly limits the information considered in the decision. State
vs. Hills, 130 Idaho 763, 947 P.2d 1011 (App.1997). Nothing has been presented to suggest that

any additional information which either party desires the court to consider could not have been
submitted by affidavit.
A sentence must be reasonable under the facts of the case. State vs. Hassett, 110 Idaho
570, 716 P.2d 1342 (Ct.App.1986). A reasonable sentence is one that appears necessary, at the
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of sentencing, to accomplish

or

primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
at

of

680 P.2d at 872. A district court judge may consider facts presented at the original sentencing as
as any other information concerning the defendant's rehabilitative progress while in

DISCUSSION
fashioning a sentence, the court must consider the legitimate objectives of sentencing:
punishment; rehabilitation; deterrence to the Defendant and to others; and, most importantly, the
protection of society. State vs. Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (App. 1982).
After reviewing the entirety of the record before it, the court is not persuaded that the
sentence imposed by the court is unjust, unduly harsh, or inappropriate. The Defendant in 2005
negotiated a binding Rule 11 plea agreement wherein he agreed to the sentence that was
ultimately ordered-it was binding upon the court. Defendant now asks that the sentence he
negotiated no longer be binding upon him. The Defendant had served county jail time as a
condition of probation, with work release, so that he could try to take care of his family and to
pay the substantial amount of restitution that was ordered by the court. Over the course of
several years, he bumped along on probation but struggled with maintaining employment and
keeping in good contact with his probation officer. He also fell woefully short in paying
restitution. The court on the previous probation violations, and earlier review hearings, had tried

to work with the Defendant to help him have success despite his wife's medical problems and,
later, his own medical issues. However, the Defendant did not fulfill his responsibilities on
probation, and made himself unavailable to supervision, as evidenced by the length of time
between the issuance of the last probation violation warrant and the time the warrant was
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONDISER SENTENCE PURSUANT TO IDAHO
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actually served on the Defendant. Given the number of years that the Defendant had been on
probation; the lack of steady commitment to restitution payments that he had demonstrated; his
unwillingness to keep in close contact with his probation officer; and his apparent intention to
"ride out" his probationary period under the radar, with a staggering amount of restitution
unpaid; the court determined that the Defendant did not appreciate the privilege of probation and
that he needed accountability for the serious crime of Aggravated Driving Under the Influence
that had produced such a significant financial impact. Although Defendant argues that he had no
offenses, he did have at least one misdemeanor driving-related offense, and, since he did not
keep in contact v.ith his probation officer for prolonged periods of time, his claim that he stayed
away from alcohol cannot be verified. In his Rule 35 motion, the Defendant also submits new
information concerning his medical condition. However, it appears that the medical issues are
being addressed while Defendant is incarcerated and nothing has been submitted that justifies the
Defendant's premature release from the sentence due to a medical hardship or emergency.
Defendant agreed to the original sentence, including the two year fixed term which he
now wishes to have reduced. Defendant also agreed to conditions of probation, which he has
violated on different occasions and was given multiple opportunities to rectify. The court
concludes that to reduce the Defendant's negotiated sentence on the record before it would not
send the appropriate message of deterrence, and would most certainly depreciate the seriousness
of the Defendant's crime.

ORDER
On the grounds, and for the reasons stated, Defendant's Motion for Reduction in
Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is hereby DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

,-qFday

2013.

~
(?~
ealc.Kerrick
istrict Judge
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a true and correct copy of the foregoing document as served
the following, eit.'ler by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by personal service; by
courthouse basket; or by facsimile copy:

Aaron Bazzoli
Mimura Law Office
Canyon County Public Defender
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Bryan F. Taylor
Will Fletcher
Office of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany

Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Idaho Department of Correction
Records Department
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706

5___

Dated this _ _ _

day of February, 2013.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court
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